The Philosophy of Communication and Information by Stegmann, Ulrich
1 
 
Draft 3: 30/4/2015 
 
[To appear in L. Floridi (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Information] 
 
Chapter 25: The Philosophy of Communication and Information 
 
Ulrich Stegmann 
School of Divinity, History and Philosophy, University of Aberdeen 
 
Introduction 
 
What is the relation between communication and information? At first glance, the answer seems 
straightforward. Communication occurs when a sender conveys information to a receiver. And 
information is what is being conveyed by a sender to a receiver. This is how human language, a 
paradigmatic communication system, appears to work. You ask your friend for the time and are 
told that it is 4 pm. It is natural to think that this is an instance of communication because your 
friend conveyed to you the information that it is 4 pm. The natural answer carries a long way, but 
not all the way.  
This chapter discusses four issues that are central to our current understanding of 
communication and its relation to information. The first issue concerns the nature of 
communication. What is communication? The second issue is communication as a possibly 
distinguishing feature of humans. What, if anything, is communication in non-human animals? 
The third topic concerns the dynamics of communication. How can communication systems arise 
and how can they be maintained? The last issue is the relation between information and 
communication. How important is information to communication?  
 
 
What is communication? 
 
Some of the most influential views about the nature of communication originated from thinking 
about one particular communication system, human language. Philosophers of language are 
particularly active in attempting to determine the nature and mechanisms of linguistic 
communication. They commonly distinguish between the code model and the inferential model 
of communication. Some authors add two further accounts of communication, the signaling 
model and the extended senses model.  
According to the code model, physical signals (lines on paper, sounds, and so on) are 
associated with distinct thoughts. A group of signals and their associated thoughts constitute a 
code. The code is shared between speakers and hearers. When a speaker intends to communicate 
her thought to a hearer, she first determines which physical signal is associated with her thought 
(encoding) and then sends that signal to the hearer. The hearer perceives only the physical signal. 
But he can retrieve the speaker’s thought by determining which thought the code assigns to the 
signal he receives (decoding). The gist of the code model can be illustrated with conventional 
codes.  
Suppose the captain of a stranded ship wants to communicate to a rescue aircraft that it is 
probably safe to land here. Luckily she remembers the international ground/air emergency code. 
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The code has a symbol with precisely that meaning (Δ, fig. 1). So she and her crew dig a Δ-
shaped system of ditches in the sand. The aircraft pilot perceives only the shape in the sand. Yet, 
in virtue of consulting the same code, he retrieves the captain’s belief that it is probably safe to 
land here. Communication has occurred.  
 
 
Figure 1: Some signals from the international ground/air emergency code.  
 
The code model has informed much theorizing about human verbal communication. Until 
well into the 20th century, many scholars regarded spoken and written words as signals that are 
associated with specific thoughts. Speakers convey their thoughts by putting them into words 
and hearers apply a shared code to the speakers’ utterances in order to retrieve the thoughts. The 
model is therefore very close to the intuitive view of communication sketched at the beginning. 
Communication occurs when a sender conveys a piece of information (meaning or thought) to a 
sender, and information is what is being conveyed. The code model adds to this view a claim 
about how the information is conveyed. Information is conveyed by means of a correspondence 
rule that assigns discrete meanings to physical signals (the code). Semioticians like Ferdinand 
Saussure (1916) sought to establish this account as a general theory of communication. The code 
model also underpinned important strands within modern philosophy of language (compositional 
theories of meaning) and linguistics (generative semantics).  
The code model has a noteworthy consequence. It implies that language comprehension 
involves no more than recovering the linguistic meaning of a sentence (Bach and Harnish 1979; 
Sperber and Wilson 1995). This implication, however, is untenable. Consider the sentence  
 
[1] “You will be here tomorrow” 
 
The sentence has a linguistic meaning. It means, roughly, that the hearer will be where the 
speaker is now, at the time of utterance, the day after the speaker utters the sentence. 
Nevertheless, the sentence is referentially ambiguous. If Kate utters [1] to John in his office on 4 
April, then the sentence conveys the thought that John will be in his office on 5 April. But if 
John phones Kate from his home on 30 April, then the same sentence conveys the thought that 
Kate will be at John’s home on 1 May. So, in order to comprehend precisely which thought [1] 
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conveys, the hearer must do more than merely determine (decode) its linguistic meaning. What is 
conveyed in these exchanges is more than what is linguistically encoded.  
Moreover, suppose Kate utters [1] as John’s line manager, intending to convey that John 
ought to be there. In this context, Kate takes the attitude of requesting or ordering towards [1]; 
uttering [1] is said to carry “illocutionary force”. It is important to both John and Kate that her 
attitude is conveyed to John. But John will not understand that he has been given an order if all 
he does is to decode the sentence’s linguistic meaning.  
Finally, a sentence may not express the intended thought explicitly. When Kate says “Mary 
is always right” in an ironic tone, then that sentence implies Kate’s belief that Mary is not always 
right (the implied thought is an “implicature”). Again, determining the sentence’s linguistic 
meaning will not be enough for the hearer to grasp what the sentence conveys.  
Many philosophers of language agree that these limitations render the simple code model 
inadequate as an account of human verbal communication. In response, many pragmatists seek to 
add a separate, pragmatic level of decoding. It remains controversial, however, whether rules of 
pragmatic interpretation can save the code model (Sperber and Wilson 1995). Let us now turn to 
the inferential account of communication. 
 According to the inferential model, the crucial elements in communication are intentions 
and inferences. The speaker has a thought she wants to convey and intends the hearer to figure it 
out. In human verbal communication, she provides evidence for her thought by uttering a 
sentence. The hearer tries to infer the speaker’s thought by attending to her utterance, its 
contexts, and certain rules of conversation. Communication has occurred if he succeeds in 
inferring the speaker’s thought.  
Inferential models originated with a seminal paper by Grice (1957). Grice focused on the 
speaker’s intention to convey something by uttering a sentence. He asked: under what conditions 
does the speaker “mean” something by making an utterance? According to Grice, a speaker S 
means something by uttering x if and only if S intends 
 
(a) x to produce a certain response in a certain audience A, 
(b) A to recognize S’s intention (a) 
(c) A’s recognition of S’s intention (a) to function as at least part of A’s reason for A’s 
response r.1  
 
Suppose Kate wants to convey to John her belief that birds can fly and so she says “birds can 
fly”. Kate intends (a) the sounds of “birds can fly” to produce in John the belief that birds can 
fly, (b) John to recognize her intention, and (c) John’s recognition of her intention to be part of 
John’s reasons for believing that birds can fly. Here the speaker-meaning of the sentence “birds 
can fly” matches its linguistic meaning. But the two can come apart. If Kate says ironically to 
John “Mary is always right”, then she intends John to believe the opposite of the sentence’s 
linguistic meaning.  
For our purposes the main point of Grice’s account of speaker-meaning is twofold. First, his 
account is widely taken as an account of communication. It is concerned with utterances, which 
are paradigmatic vehicles of human communication. Crucially, the account specifies the 
conditions under which utterances manage the feat of getting the hearer to entertain the speaker’s 
thought. Second, grasping the speaker’s thought relies on the hearer’s inferential abilities. It 
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relies in particular on the hearer’s ability to infer the speaker’s intention to convey a thought by 
employing her utterance as a piece of evidence.  
Shortcomings of Grice’s original analysis prompted many revisions (e.g. Bach and Harnish 
1979; Avramides 1989). An influential account indebted to, but clearly distinct from, Grice’s 
analysis is relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Carston 2002). Relevance theory seeks to 
address the worry that understanding is often rapid and does not require a self-conscious process 
of inferential reasoning. Relevance theorists argue that understanding utterances is a sub-
personal, computational process, rather than a high-level cognitive activity.  
Human linguistic communication is now often construed along broadly Gricean lines. 
Contemporary pragmatists regard human verbal communication as involving features of both the 
code and the inferential model. There is, however, a third view of the nature of communication. 
The code and inferential models can be seen as focusing too much on the speaker’s mental 
states (Green 2007). On the inferential model, for instance, the route to entertaining Kate’s 
thought that birds can fly goes through John’s inferring that Kate wants him to believe that birds 
can fly. On the code model, John determines which thoughts are associated with Kate’s 
utterance. Some philosophers emphasize that communication is less about gaining access to the 
speaker’s mental states and more about gaining access to the speaker’s perceptions of the world 
(McDowell 1980; Millikan 2004). If Kate phones John to tell him that an important letter has 
arrived, John learns something about Kate’s intentions or her attitude towards the letter’s arrival. 
But more importantly, he also gains access to a state of the world he presently cannot perceive 
himself. The primary goal of communication is therefore to “widen each other’s perceptual 
reach” (Green 2007, p. 10). Green characterizes this view as a third model of communication, 
referring to it as the ‘extended senses’ model. It is unclear, however, whether this view 
constitutes a distinct account of communication or whether it merely represents a shift of 
emphasis (from speaker’s mental states to states of the world).  
Some philosophers distinguish a fourth account of communication, the signaling model 
(Bennett 1976; Green 2007). Since the signaling model aims to capture the ostensibly 
communicative interactions in non-human animals, it will be discussed in the next section.  
Before turning to communication in non-human animals, it is worth noting that so far we 
assumed receivers to acquire the same thoughts as the senders. This is indeed a widely held 
view, although one generally accepted without much argument. Several philosophers endorse a 
less demanding view (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995; Carston 2002). On that view successful 
communication requires only some degree of similarity between the contents of speakers and 
hearers: for A to understand what B said is for A to grasp a proposition similar to the one 
expressed by B. There are several difficulties with the weaker view, however. For instance, it 
becomes difficult to make sense of the standard distinction between, on the one hand, saying or 
understanding exactly what someone said and, on the other hand, saying or understanding 
something similar but not identical (Cappelen and Lepore 2006).  
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Communication in non-human animals 
 
This section explores the sense in which communication occurs in non-human animals. After 
introducing two ways of crediting animals with communicative abilities, the focus will be on 
the relation between animal communication and human language.  
Human language takes pride of place in philosophical work on communication. Yet 
communication is arguably a much broader phenomenon. Biologists of all stripes agree that 
non-human animals can communicate. They point to the roaring contests of rival stags, the 
waggle dance of honey bees, and a panoply of other interactions in a wide range of species. 
An instance of animal communication that has attracted much attention is the alarm call 
system of vervet monkeys. Vervets can emit three acoustically distinct types of alarm calls in 
response to perceiving three classes of predators (snakes, leopards, eagles). Monkeys that 
have not perceived the threat but hear an alarm call respond as they would to the predator 
itself, e.g. run up a tree when hearing the leopard-specific alarm call. Vervets thus seem to 
warn one another about the presence of snakes and other predators. However, animal senders 
lack intentions to inform receivers. Even ardent defenders of the reality of animal 
communication admit that while senders emit signals that are meaningful and informative to 
receivers, there is no evidence that senders are in a psychological state of intending to inform 
others (e.g. Seyfarth and Cheney 2003). The lack of such intentions is problematic because it 
threatens to undermine the very idea of communication in animals. Recall that 
communication is often conceived in broadly Gricean terms, as involving a set of complex 
mental states, e.g. intentions to inform others and intentions for others to recognize one’s 
intention. How can this tension be resolved? 
One answer is inspired by an instrumentalist approach towards propositional attitudes. The 
instrumentalist approach is exemplified by Daniel Dennett’s (1983) intentional stance. One takes 
an intentional stance towards a system if one explains and predicts its behavior by attributing to 
it mental states. Attributing mental states to a system can be justified simply on the basis of 
increasing explanatory and predictive power. Importantly, this practice is justifiable even if the 
system lacks the attributed mental states in any psychologically realistic sense. So, in the present 
context the crucial question is whether or not attributing complex Gricean intentions yields a 
significant epistemic pay-off. If it does, then it is reasonable to construe animals as engaging in 
strong, Gricean communication. Whether or not the intentions are psychological real is 
irrelevant.  
Another answer is to allow that communication comes in different forms and that, 
furthermore, animals instantiate a comparatively unsophisticated variant. Several philosophers 
distinguish more or less explicitly between communication in a strong, Gricean sense and 
communication in a weak sense, as information transfer. Animals are then regarded as engaging 
in the latter but not the former (Bennett 1976; McDowell 1980).  
Information transfer is the core of the fourth account of communication, the signaling 
model. On the signaling model, animals do not need to entertain communicative intentions, nor 
do they need to encode thoughts or extend each other’s perceptual reach. They only need 
behaviors that have the evolutionary function to convey information (Bennett 1976). Bennett’s 
version of the signaling model was broadened by Green (2007). For Green signals are structures 
designed for transferring information, where the design may be due to evolution or deliberate 
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planning. Systems communicate with one another as long as they exhibit structures designed to 
convey information, whether the design is a due to a natural process or human deliberation. 
The signaling model of communication resonates well with the sciences. In animal behavior 
studies, communication is normally understood as information transfer by means of signals 
(Bradbury and Vehrencamp 2011). Signals are structures or behaviors that evolved in order to 
convey information. The roaring of stags during the mating season, for example, is taken to have 
evolved in order to convey information to his rivals about the sender’s fighting prowess. Signals 
are distinguished from cues. Cues convey information without having evolved for this purpose. 
The amount of time a starling spends foraging on a patch informs other flock mates about how 
much food is left. Yet foraging time has not evolved in order to convey information about how 
much food is left; it is simply a function of how readily the starling finds food.  
However, the signaling model is much less straightforward than the slogan “information 
transfer” suggests. We will look in more detail at the role of information in communication 
below. As we will see, the status of information is unclear and partly contentious. Here I bracket 
these complexities and, instead, focus on the relation between human language and animal 
communication. This topic is important because even if one accepts that animals can 
communicate in some sense, there are significant differences between human and animal 
communication. Indeed, linguistic communication was for a long time seen as the distinctive 
mark of humans. 
Philosophers like John McDowell, Robert Brandom, and Donald Davidson stand in this 
tradition. They see the differences between human language and animal communication as 
symptomatic of a fundamental discontinuity. The discontinuity has two aspects (Bar-On 2013a). 
One aspect is the gulf in communication systems among humans and current animal species 
(“synchronic discontinuity”); another is the impossibility of a philosophically illuminating 
account of the emergence of human language from non-linguistic precursors (“diachronic 
discontinuity”). The three philosophers do not deny that, since humans evolved from animals, 
our linguistic abilities have precursors in the sense of there being certain stages in language 
evolution that differ from our present state. Human language is not a miracle, appearing fully-
formed out of nowhere. But attempting to trace those precursors is to stay within the descriptive 
realm of the natural sciences. And such descriptions cannot do justice to our linguistic practices, 
which are thoroughly normative. Their normativity surfaces in the rules that render the 
application of words to things correct and incorrect. McDowell (1980) therefore insists that our 
linguistic practices figure in “the logical space of reason”, which is distinct from the logical 
space of the natural sciences. No list of human language precursors will bridge these two spaces. 
Human verbal communication is not an elaboration of animal communication.  
Davidson (2001) and Brandom (2009) emphasize the (purported) inability of animals to 
form concepts. Davidson concedes that animals respond differently to the presence and absence 
of external objects and to the behaviors of others. Animals can also respond to another 
individual’s behavior as they would respond to the object itself, as seen in vervets. There is even 
a possibility of error. A vervet, say, might run up the tree in response to a leopard-specific alarm 
call, although the sender has emitted the call by mistake (what looked like a leopard from the 
distance turned out to be an antelope). Yet these abilities are no more than the manifestations of 
dispositions and habits. Animals lack concepts of phenomena like truth and belief. They 
consequently do not treat the sender as a subject with its own point of view about the world, a 
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view that may be true or false. Such an ability already requires possessing a language (Davidson 
2001). There is then no intelligible intermediate stage between the non-linguistic, concept-free 
communication of animals and linguistic communication in humans. Again, the latter is not a 
more elaborate version of the former. Bar-On (2013a) calls the approach of these authors 
“continuity skepticism”. 
Continuity skepticism comes under pressure from two directions. One source of pressure 
are certain conceptual advances in economics and evolutionary biology. Evolutionary game 
theory, for instance, raises the prospect of naturalising the origin of communication systems. 
We will return to this topic in the next section. First we will look at the second source of 
pressure, i.e. the spectrum of empirical findings from linguistics and psychology.  
Scientifically inclined theorists of language evolution tend to advocate a multi-
component view of human language. “Human language” here refers to the internal (neural 
and psychological) faculty that allows humans to learn and employ culturally specific 
communication systems, such as Chinese or English. On the multi-component view, the 
human language faculty is composed of several partly independent subsystems. Each 
subsystem has its own neural implementation and function (e.g. Christiansen and Kirby 
2003; Fitch 2010). Now, some components of the human language faculty are found in 
animal species, whereas others are not. We already encountered one of the missing 
components: the intentions on the part of senders to inform receivers (e.g. Seyfarth and 
Cheney 2003). Two other missing features are the possession of a large vocabulary (e.g. 
Fitch 2010) and, more controversially, “discrete infinity” (Hauser et al. 2002). Discrete 
infinity is the ability to construct and understand an infinite number of linguistic expressions, 
where the expressions are composed of a finite set of components. While animals lack these 
components of the human language faculty, others are present in at least some animal 
communication systems. One example is the ability to employ signals or expressions in order 
to refer to states in the environment. This is what the vervets appear to do when emitting a 
leopard-specific alarm call in response to a leopard (Cheney and Seyfarth 2007). 
Furthermore, animal receivers engage in inferences on the basis of perceiving a signal and 
their background knowledge (e.g. Fitch 2010). So, according to the multi-component view, 
there is not so great a gap between human language and the communication system that 
existed in the hominid lineage descending from our last common ancestor with chimpanzees. 
The gap was closed by piecemeal acquisition of the components that now make up the 
human language faculty.  
Contemporary theorists of language evolution focus on the precise order in which our 
“proto-language” evolved from our ancestors. Some theorists argue that the evolution of 
sophisticated mental abilities preceded the evolution of linguistic expressions. These theorists 
maintain that a crucial first step was the evolution of the ability to form communicative 
intentions and the ability to attribute mental states to others (e.g. Fitch 2010). Recently, some 
philosophers have revived the hypothesis that language evolved from innate affective 
expressions, such as screams or sighs. On this account, fully-fledged communicative 
intentions were not preconditions for language evolution (Bar-On 2013b).  
In conclusion, there is a remarkable overlap between animal and human communication, 
alongside the undeniable differences. Characterising this overlap, and tracing possible 
precursors of human linguistic communication, can illuminate the nature of human language 
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itself. This undermines radical continuity scepticism. As indicated above, the continuity 
sceptic comes under pressure also from theoretical advances. The next section sketches some 
of these advances and explores their significance for our understanding of communication.  
 
 
The emergence and persistence of communication systems  
 
Suppose you want to establish a communication system. You start performing some actions in 
order to convey a thought, e.g. blow a whistle to convey “come over here!” You must get the 
prospective receiver to interpret your action as a signal. This is easy if you can tell him what the 
signal is supposed to mean, because you can then rely on a pre-existing and shared 
communication system. But it is hard to see how you could achieve this without telling him, or 
without employing some alternative means of communication. So, how can a system of signs 
emerge in the first instance? David Lewis (1969) answered this question by appeal to rational 
choice theory. More recently, philosophers have turned to evolutionary games theory. Both 
approaches suggest that communication systems can emerge, and be maintained, without prior 
and explicit agreement among its users.   
Consider, first, the rational choice approach. Two biologists, Nelly and Steve, aim to prove 
the presence of otters along a river. They first have to find footprints or other evidence at several 
locations and then document the evidence by taking pictures and producing some casts. Nimble 
Nelly searches down at the river bank whereas stout Steve remains with the bulky equipment up 
on the main road, delivering it to Nelly if and when needed. Since Nelly cannot document the 
evidence without the equipment and Steve does not know when and where to deliver it, they 
need to coordinate their actions. Coordination is achieved by a system whereby Nelly whistles 
just in case she finds evidence and Steve brings the equipment just in case Nelly whistles. That 
is, Nelly follows strategy Ne1 and Steve implements strategy St1 (tab. 1).  
 
 
Table 1: A sender-receiver game. Each of the players can choose between two strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nelly’s strategy  Ne1  If there is evidence, then whistle 
If there is no evidence, then remain silent 
Nelly’s strategy  Ne2 If there is evidence, then remain silent 
If there is no evidence, then whistle 
Steve’s strategy  St1 If Nelly whistles, bring  her the equipment  
If Nelly remains silent, stay with equipment in truck 
Steve’s strategy  St2 If Nelly whistles,  stay with equipment in truck  
If Nelly remains silent, bring  her the equipment  
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The combination of strategies <Ne1, St1> benefits both participants equally: If Nelly whistles 
when finding evidence and Steve fetches the equipment, they can document the evidence; and if 
she remains silent in the absence of evidence and Steve stays away, then they keep the 
equipment in good shape for later use. Let us represent the positive outcome as a pay-off with 
the value “1” (top left cell in table 2). Both suffer, however, if one of them departs from this 
combination of strategies. For example, if Nelly whistles when finding evidence (Ne1), but Steve 
reacts by staying away with the equipment (St2), then they cannot document the evidence. The 
pay-off for implementing combination <Ne1, St2> is “0” (bottom left cell in table 2). Note that 
the combination <Ne2, St2> is beneficial.  
 
 
Table 2: A pay-off matrix for the sender-receiver game.  
 
 Nelly’s strategies 
Ne1 Ne2 
Steve’s strategies St1 1 0 
St2 0 1 
 
 
Nelly and Steve implement a system in which each action always matches a state of the world, 
e.g. a whistle matches the presence of evidence. Moreover, the pay-off is optimal in the sense 
that neither participant could increase her/his pay-off by deviating from the system. The system 
is said to be in a so-called Nash equilibrium. Finally, it is natural to describe the whistles as 
having a meaning, perhaps something like “Bring the equipment over here!” Lewis called an 
optimal system of interactions of this kind a “signaling system”. Signaling systems belong to a 
larger class of communicative interactions, which are known as “sender-receiver games” in 
rational choice theory.  
Let us now ask how such a system of interactions can arise in the first place. Lewis assumed 
that in coordination tasks agents are instrumentally rational and choose whichever action is most 
beneficial to them. So Nelly and Steve might simply discuss the various combinations, discard 
those with zero pay-off, and choose <Ne1, St1> because it requires whistling only occasionally 
(unlike <Ne2, St2>). In this case the task is solved by explicit agreement and prior 
communication. However, Lewis saw that prior communication is in fact unnecessary. Choosing 
a particular coordination equilibrium, like <Ne1, St1>, may also be down to salience, precedent, 
or chance. Suppose Nelly and Steve quarrel and eventually Nelly storms off while Steve retreats 
to the equipment. Since resentful Nelly is inclined to whistle only when she finds it necessary in 
order to draw Steve’s attention, she implements Ne1 by habit (chance). Steve expects Nelly to let 
him know when to fetch the equipment and therefore decides to stay with the equipment until he 
hears from her (St1). Assuming that his expectation results from previous experience with 
fieldwork, he implements St1 mostly due to precedent. Consequently, our team can solve their 
coordination problem without first agreeing on how to coordinate their actions. Nonetheless, 
they still need to act in an instrumentally rational way. They must still choose actions that they 
believe to be in their common interest.  
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The key lesson to be drawn from Lewis’ (1969) rational choice approach is that 
communication systems can arise spontaneously. Communicators do not need prior agreement 
about which particular signaling convention to adopt (see chapter 12). Lewis argued, in addition, 
that explicit agreement is unnecessary for maintaining a communication system. While 
eliminating explicit agreement as a precondition, Lewis’ solution still relies on conscious agents 
and rational decision-making. Some philosophers have gone further, purging rational agents 
from the explanation of communication. They employ evolutionary games theory to argue that 
communication systems can arise and be maintained through purely natural, biological processes 
(e.g. Huttegger 2007; Skyrms 2010). That is, the dynamics of communication systems can be 
fully “naturalised”. The following paragraphs introduce the evolutionary games theory approach 
(see chapter 13).  
Suppose there are two cognitively unsophisticated organisms with innate behavioral 
dispositions. Senders perceive certain states of affairs and react by behaving in distinct ways. 
Receivers can perceive the senders’ behaviors and respond with some further behavior that has 
equal consequences for both. In the simplest case there are two states of the world, two 
organisms, and two types of behavior for each organism (tab. 3). 
 
 
Table 3: Sender and receiver strategies for responding to food.  
 
 
 
Suppose some senders follow strategy S1. That is, they emit chemical substance F if they locate 
food but substance N as long as they do not. Other senders simply swap the substances they emit 
in response to the presence and absence of food (S2). Receivers also have two choices. Some 
move towards the sender when perceiving F but continue searching for food as long as they 
perceive N (R1). Others respond in the opposite way to the two substances (R2). We assume that 
an individual’s genes determine which strategy it follows. 
The receiver’s behavior will generate pay-offs for both the receiver and the sender (table 4). 
We also assume that the pay-offs are always the same for both. For instance, both sender and 
receiver benefit from the combination of strategies S1 and R1. The sender emits substance F 
when locating food. The receiver’s response, moving towards the sender, allows them to jointly 
process the food for consumption (pay-off = 1, top left cell in table 4). If the receiver does not 
approach the sender (R2), they waste the food.    
 
Sender strategy  S1  If there is food, then emit substance F 
If there is no food, then emit substance N 
Sender strategy  S2 If there is food, then emit substance N 
If there is no food, then emit substance F 
Receiver strategy  R1 If perceiving F, move towards sender  
If perceiving N, continue searching for food 
Receiver strategy  R2 If perceiving F,  continue searching for food  
If perceiving N,  move towards sender 
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Table 4: A pay-off matrix for food-searching organisms.   
    
 Sender strategies 
S1 S2 
Receiver strategies R1 1 0 
R2 0 1 
 
 
Strategy combinations < S1, R1> and < S2, R2>  show how a receiver can respond appropriately to 
world states even if it cannot perceive that state itself and relies, instead, on the sender’s 
behavior. Given that senders and receivers successfully coordinate their behaviors in response to 
states of the world, it is natural to gloss their coordination as an instance of communication by 
means of signals (e.g. with compound F meaning something like “There is food”).  
Let us now ask how such a system can emerge and how it can be maintained. In order to 
address this question we need to shift our focus from individuals to populations. Recall that the 
strategy an individual organism pursues is genetically determined. So they cannot change their 
strategies within their lifetime. But populations can drop or adopt strategies in the sense of 
decreasing or increasing the relative numbers of individuals pursuing any given strategy. The 
change of numbers is a consequence of how many offspring an individual with a given strategy 
has (we assume that individuals simply pass on their own strategy to their offspring). We assume 
two populations, one composed of senders and the other of receivers. Senders pursue either 
strategy S1 or S2 and receivers either R1 or R2. 
The emergence and maintenance of communication strategies at population level are 
illustrated in figure 2. The vertical axis represents the proportion of senders implementing 
strategy S2 (“S2-senders”) as opposed to strategy S1 (“S1-senders”). The horizontal axis represents 
the proportion of receivers implementing strategy R2 (“R2-receivers”) as opposed to strategy R1 
(“R1-receivers”). Thus, any point in the square represents a pair of populations with a certain 
combination of S1- and S2-senders as well as R1- and R2-receivers. The arrows indicate the 
directions in which natural selection will change a given combination over evolutionary time. 
Suppose the population starts from somewhere near the lower right hand corner of the square, 
which represents a population in which most senders are S1 and most receivers are R2. The pay-
offs for most senders and receivers are then 0 (bottom left cell in table 4). Natural selection will 
therefore drive the two populations away from this composition on one of many possible 
trajectories. For illustration, consider the following two trajectories:  
 
(1) Most senders remain S1, so that R1-receivers will produce more offspring than R2-receivers. 
In the next generation the process repeats itself. Over a few generations R1-receivers will 
therefore become more frequent in the population. This process will move the system along 
the bottom of the horizontal axis to the left, towards < S1, R1>. The combination of strategies 
< S1, R1> is evolutionarily stable. A combination of strategies is evolutionarily stable if 
natural selection drives the system towards it (starting from other combinations) and if 
natural selection allows the system to persist in this state.  
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(2) The proportion of both S2-senders and R1-receivers increase more or less simultaneously; this 
will drive the system diagonally towards the middle of the square, where half the sender 
population are S1 and the other half are S2 (likewise for receivers). Populations with these 
compositions are evolutionarily unstable, and selection will eventually drive them to either < 
S1, R1> or < S2, R2>. Which of the two equilibria will eventually be reached depends on both 
the starting point and the initial trajectory, and both factors can have random causes. 
 
Figure 2: The evolutionary dynamics of two populations, one composed of senders and the 
other of receivers. Senders pursue either strategy S1 or S2, receivers either R1 or R2 (see tab. 3) 
Vertical axis: proportion of S2-senders; horizontal axis: proportion of R2-receivers. Adapted from 
Skyrms 2010 (by permission from Oxford University Press). 
 
 
The upshot is that communication systems can arise and persist without organisms 
exercising rational choice or entertaining intentions to communicate. Their signals have a kind of 
meaning, a meaning that is sufficient to coordinate their behaviors in response to environmental 
circumstances. An obvious concern is the large gap between the very simple system described 
here and real-world communication systems, especially human natural languages. Much formal 
work goes into narrowing this gap by complicating the conditions in various ways, e.g. by 
introducing more players or allowing for fewer signals than there are world states.  
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Information and communication 
 
In exploring various aspects of communication, we helped ourselves to the notion of information 
whenever convenient. It is time to have a more careful look at the relation between these two 
phenomena. The section starts with a sketch of three notions of information pertinent to 
communication. The remainder of the section considers information in the signaling model, 
where it is meant to play a particularly central role.  
According to the intuitive view of communication sketched at the beginning of this chapter, 
“information” denotes whatever is communicated. A large number of things have been proposed 
as the content of communication. The list includes propositions, thoughts, linguistic meaning, 
emotions, beliefs, and attitudes among others. On this view the relation between information and 
communication is very close. Any communication process involves a transfer of information 
because communication is about something or other.  
Pragmatists tend to use a stricter notion of information. According to Sperber and Wilson 
(1995), for instance, information is any thought (conceptual representation) that is presented as 
factual. Information excludes emotions and attitudes but is not restricted to facts or truths. This 
notion of information has two important consequences. First, communication does not require, 
and is not limited to, the transfer of information. Emotions and attitudes can also be 
communicated (Bach and Harnish 1979). Recall the situation in which Kate is John’s line 
manager and she requests John to be there by uttering “You will be here tomorrow”. Kate 
communicates not only the thought that John will be there but, in addition, the attitude she takes 
towards her thought. Second, to the extent that information is transferred, both truths and falsities 
can be communicated (Sperber and Wilson 1995). If John comes to believe that the Earth is flat 
on the basis of Kate’s uttering “The Earth is flat”, then Kate has conveyed information to John. It 
does not matter that the thought is false.  
A third, mathematically based notion of information is employed when using evolutionary 
games theory to investigate the origin and maintenance of communication systems (Skyrms 
2010). Suppose a signal’s occurrence makes some state more probable than it would be 
otherwise. For instance, dark clouds in the sky make rain more probable than a cloudless sky. 
The dark clouds are then informative in the sense that someone who knows about the general 
relation between clouds and rain can learn something from the current presence of dark clouds. 
They can infer that rain is more likely now. Skyrms suggests that a signal carries information 
about some state of the world to the extent it changes (increases or decreases) the state’s 
probability. The more the signal changes the probability, the more information it carries. And if 
it does not change the probability it carries no information. Skyrms’s notion of information is a 
particular version of probabilistic theories of natural information (Stegmann 2014).  
Finally, recall that information plays a dominant role in the signaling model. 
Communication consists in evolved signals transferring information from senders to receivers. 
The remainder of this section therefore explores more closely the status of information within the 
signaling model. For this purpose we will focus on animal communication, because it is the 
model’s primary home. In what follows I make two main points. The first is that, on closer 
inspection, “information transfer” turns out to be an ambiguous notion because there is no 
generally accepted definition of information in animal communication studies. The second point 
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is that even within animal communication studies it is controversial whether communication 
amounts to information transfer at all (see chapter 23 for information in other areas of biology). 
Within animal communication studies the information concept is employed in at least four 
different ways (Stegmann 2013). In some contexts, carrying information is simply a matter of 
correlation. An example is the ‘waggle dance’ of honey bees. Karl von Frisch discovered that 
certain features of the waggle dance correlate with the location of valuable resources. He also 
claimed that worker bees use these features in order to find the resources. In the 1970s some 
ethologists suggested that the recruits use the dancer’s odors instead. This gave rise to a 
protracted and bitter dispute known as the “bee language controversy”. It was fiercely contested 
whether or not bee recruits use the dancer’s movements in order to find food. However, all sides 
accepted that the movements correlate with the location of resources, and all appear to have 
agreed that the movements carry spatial information (Munz 2005). It is therefore likely that 
participants of the bee language controversy understood information merely in terms of 
correlation. That is, a signal carries information about a state S if it correlates with S. This sense 
of information may be captured by probabilistic theories of natural information.  
In other contexts, carrying information is construed as a receiver-dependent feature. Many 
authors use “information” interchangeably with what receivers come to know, what they infer, or 
what they predict when perceiving a signal (e.g. Seyfarth et al. 2010; Bradbury and Vehrencamp 
2011). A signal’s information content is thus equated with what receivers predict, infer, or learn 
from it and is therefore a receiver-dependent property. “Predictions” and “inferences” are here 
used in a broad sense that does not presuppose significant cognitive abilities. As a corollary, 
carrying information, too, becomes a receiver-dependent property. A signal carries information 
relative to, say, members of the same species that can predict something from it. But it does not 
carry information relative to a different species whose members cannot use it for predictions. In 
short, a signal carries information about a state S just in case a receiver can infer S from it.  
Furthermore, a signal’s “carrying information” is sometimes construed as being dependent 
not only on the presence of a receiver, but also on the way in which the receiver processes the 
signal. Some ethologists distinguish informational from non-informational interactions on the 
basis of whether or not the signal evokes in the receiver a mental representation or a “mental 
image” of the referent. Some referential signals, like the vervet monkey’s alarm calls, are said to 
carry information just in case receivers infer or predict something from them by means of these 
internal states. Correspondingly, the term “information” is used to denote whatever a receiver’s 
mental representations encode (e.g. Maynard Smith and Harper 2003; Seyfarth and Cheney 
2003). In these contexts, a signal carries information about a state S just in case it elicits in the 
receiver a mental representation of S.   
Finally, the idea that signals enable receivers to make predictions or acquire knowledge is 
often put in terms reducing the receiver’s uncertainty about a state of the world (Seyfarth et al. 
2010; Wheeler et al. 2011). It is natural to interpret “reduction of uncertainty” psychologically, 
i.e. as referring to a receiver becoming more confident or certain that a state obtains. But 
uncertainty is also often understood in terms of the quantities of Shannon’s mathematical theory 
of communication. Two such quantities are “Shannon entropy” and “mutual information” (see 
chapter 4). This suggests a fourth way of understanding information: a signal’s information is 
identical with, or measured by, the value of the signal’s entropy/mutual information. 
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Correspondingly, a signal carries information about a state S just in case it has non-zero Shannon 
entropy/mutual information with respect to S (Halliday 1983).  
In conclusion, the term “information” is used in many different ways in animal 
communication studies and there is no information concept that is both robust and widely 
accepted. Critics have seized on this fact. They argue that “information” is often ill-defined and 
appeals to something more abstract and elusive than notions like mechanism and function (e.g. 
Rendall et al. 2009). It has also been objected that construing communication as information 
transfer has troublesome methodological consequences. On the informational construal of 
communication, we are tempted to approach all kinds of communicative processes from the 
viewpoint of just one particular instance of communication, i.e. human language. Since human 
language is highly exceptional and sophisticated, it is not a suitable starting point (Owings and 
Morton 1997).  
For these and other reasons some ethologists recommend abandoning the information 
concept (e.g. Dawkins and Krebs 1978; Owings and Morton 1997; Rendall et al. 2009). Signals 
do not convey information; they rather persuade or manipulate receivers to respond in certain 
ways. Information-free communication revolves around the idea that a signal can elicit a receiver 
response by a variety of non-informational mechanisms. For example, some primate squeaks and 
screams have acoustic properties that “directly” evoke attention and arousal (Rendall et al. 
2009). Similarly, the territorial songs of birds can impact on the receiver’s hormone levels and 
make aggressive responses more likely. Such effects do not appear to involve cognitive 
processes. Critics therefore find it inappropriate to describe these signals as carrying information 
(Owings and Morton 1997). The discussion between informational and manipulationist accounts 
of animal communication continues (e.g. Seyfarth et al. 2010).2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
1 Here I follow Strawson’s (1964) exposition.  
2 I am greatly indebted to Dorit Bar-On, Casper Hansen, Simon Hutegger, Balint Kekedi, and 
Stephan Torre for their excellent comments. Any remaining flaws are mine.  
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